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ABSTRACT
In many contexts, pronouns are interpreted as referring to the character
mentioned ﬁrst in the previous sentence, an eﬀect called the ‘ﬁrst-
mention bias’. While adults can rapidly use the ﬁrst-mention bias
to guide pronoun interpretation, it is unclear when this bias emerges
during development. Curiously, experiments with children between
two and three years old show successful use of order of mention,
while experiments with older children (four to ﬁve years old) do not.
While this could suggest U-shaped development, it could also reﬂect
diﬀerences in the methodologies employed. We show that children can
indeed use ﬁrst-mention information, but do so too slowly to have
been detected in previous work reporting null results. Comparison
across the present and previously published studies suggests that the
speed at which children deploy ﬁrst-mention information increases
greatly during the preschool years.
INTRODUCTION
Pronouns have no ﬁxed reference; rather, reference depends on context:
() a. Jane Austen is my favorite author. She wrote many popular books.
b. Ursula LeGuin is my favorite author. She wrote many popular
books.
[*] This work was presented at BUCLD  and beneﬁted from comments there. JKH’s
participation in this project was supported by the Department of Defense (DoD) through
the National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate Fellowship (NDSEG) Program.
RN’s participation was funded by a grant from the Ellison Medical Foundation
(‘Cognitive Neuroscience of Autism and Dyslexia’ to N. Kanwisher & J. Gabrieli,
subcontract to JS). Participant recruitment and expenses were funded by a grant from
the National Science Foundation ( to JS). Address for correspondence: Joshua
Hartshorne,  Massachusetts Ave., -H, Cambridge, MA . tel:  
; e-mail: jkhartshorne@gmail.com
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This is in contrast to proper names, which do not depend on context:
() a. Jane Austen is an author. Jane Austen wrote many books.
b. Ursula LeGuin is an author. Jane Austen wrote many books.
Third person pronouns frequently co-refer with the subject of the previous
sentence. For example, Arnold () found that third person subject
pronouns co-referred with the previous sentence’s subject in % of cases
in a corpus of children’s books. Adult comprehenders are sensitive to this
pattern and typically expect pronouns to co-refer with the previous subject,
even in the absence of additional clues to reference or when alternate inter-
pretations are plausible (Arnold, Eisenband, Brown-Schmidt & Trueswell,
; Corbett & Chang, ; Crawley & Stevenson, ; Crawley,
Stevenson & Kleinman, ; Gordon, Grosz & Gilliom, ; Gordon &
Scearce, ; Järvikivi, van Gompel, Hyona & Bertram, ; Kaiser &
Trueswell, ; Smyth, ; Yang, Gordon, Hendrick & Hue, ).
Thus, in (), most adults prefer that she refer to Jane Austen, not Agatha
Christie.
() Jane Austen was born long before Agatha Christie. She wrote many
books.
In English, the subject of a sentence is also almost always the
ﬁrst-mentioned noun. Consequently, this bias has typically been called the
‘ﬁrst-mention bias’, a term we adopt here. Note that additional research,
particularly work in languages where order-of-mention and subject-hood
are more easily de-confounded, has suggested that subject-hood and
order-of-mention each play distinguishable roles (Gordon & Chan, ;
Järvikivi et al., ; Kaiser & Trueswell, ; Crawley & Stevenson,
).
Many researchers have conceptualized the ﬁrst-mention bias as a
global bias that applies in all contexts. However, pronoun interpretation
biases are at least partly a function of discourse structure and conse-
quently vary depending the content of the sentences and their connection
(see especially Kehler, ; Kehler, Kertz, Rohde & Elman, ).
While many discourse structures support ﬁrst-mention biases, others
do not:
() Jane Austen liked Agatha Christie because she ...
Here, she likely refers to Agatha Christie, the second-mentioned character.
For the present, this issue is orthogonal to our main point. Our study
and literature review focuses on children’s processing of sentences which,
in adults, reliably lead to ﬁrst-mention biases. We turn to other contexts
in the ‘Discussion’.
HARTSHORNE ET AL.
The development of the ﬁrst-mention bias
While several studies on the development of the ﬁrst-mention bias have
been reported, results are mixed. While results of a number of experiments
suggest that even very young children are sensitive to the ﬁrst-mention bias
(Pyykkönen, Matthews & Järvikivi, ; Song & Fisher, , ),
results of two others indicate that they are not (Arnold, Brown-Schmidt &
Trueswell, ). Below we consider three plausible explanations for the
divergence in these ﬁndings.
Statistical error. Perhaps the simplest explanation is that either the
ﬁndings that children are sensitive to the ﬁrst-mention bias or the ﬁndings
that they are not are in error. Although more experiments have shown
positive results (ﬁve) than negative results (two), simple vote-tallying may
not work, since this evidence must be interpreted in the context of how
many false positives and false negatives one expects to ﬁnd in the literature,
which is an underdetermined and controversial question.
There is an overwhelming bias in psychology against publishing
null results (for review, see Hartshorne & Schachner, ). Thus, it is
much harder to publish false negatives than false positives, increasing
the false positive to false negative ratio in the literature. In contrast,
meta-analyses indicate that the typical psychology experiment is under-
powered, with less than a % chance of rejecting the null hypothesis even
when the null hypothesis is in fact false (Bakker, van Dijk & Wicherts,
; Hartshorne & Schachner, ). Thus, the null hypothesis is far
more likely to be falsely accepted (>%) than falsely rejected (<%).
These and other factors make it diﬃculty to determine the likely ratio of
false positives to false negatives in psychology.
There is, however, good reason to suspect that one of the results indicating
insensitivity to the ﬁrst-mention bias in children is a false negative. In
control trials for Experiment  of Arnold et al. (), pronoun reference
was disambiguated by gender (Puppy [male] is having lunch with Froggy
[female]. She wants some milk.), and thus success in interpreting the pronoun
should have been at ceiling. Nonetheless, children and adults each chose the
correct animal only % of the time (compared with chance performance of
%), suggesting deep confusion about the task, leading them to produce
either random or systematically incorrect results some portion of the time,
noise which could wash out the eﬀect of interest.
U-shaped development. The experiments showing sensitivity to the
ﬁrst-mention bias tested younger children (;–;) than the experiments
showing insensitivity (;–;), raising the intriguing possibility of
U-shaped development. While language skills generally improve throughout
development, there are aspects of development that show systematic dips in
performance. For instance, success at interpreting passive sentences drops
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during the preschool years before eventually recovering and reaching adult
performance (Bever, ; Maratsos, ). Likewise, children initially
make few if any over-regularization errors for past tense forms (goed,
holded, sleeped); if they produce a past tense form at all, they produce the
correct irregular form (went, held, slept). Over-regularization errors increase
at ages three to four, and then slowly decline thereafter (Cazden, ;
Ervin, ; Marcus, Pinker, Ullman, Hollander, Rosen & Xu, ).
U-shaped developmental trajectories are typically taken as indicating that
children initially learn to process, e.g., passives or irregular past tense verbs
one-by-one in an essentially item-based fashion. Then, at some point,
children discover a pattern elsewhere in the language that they overgeneralize
to exceptional cases. In the case of passives, they discover the dominant
active sentence pattern in which the ﬁrst verbal argument is usually the
agent. In the case of the past tense, they discover that most verbs form
their past tense by adding -ed, and they then overapply this to irregulars.
This overgeneralization leads to a spurt of errors, which are only overcome
as the system is more fully acquired.
U-shaped development for the ﬁrst-mention bias could have a similar ex-
planation: by two and half years of age, children may discover that pronouns
typically co-refer with the ﬁrst-mentioned entity from the previous sentence,
leading to high performance on sentences in which adults also show
ﬁrst-mention biases. However, as they grow older they begin to notice that
there are discourse contexts in which there is a systematic bias for subject
pronouns to refer to the object of the previous sentence (see (), above).
To capture these less frequent patterns, children would have to abandon
their global ﬁrst-mention bias in favor of a set of narrower–but more
precise–generalizations. Initially, however, they may be unsure about
which types of sentence are governed by which generalizations. This could
lead older preschoolers, like those in the Arnold et al., studies (), to
perform at chance in contexts where both younger children and adults
show a systematic ﬁrst-mention bias.
Processing speed. Strictly speaking, Arnold et al.’s( ) Experiment  did
not show that children fail to use ﬁrst-mention information to guide pronoun
interpretation, only that they fail to use that information within  ms after
pronoun onset. Like all the experiments discussed above, this experiment
employed the visual-world paradigm (Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton,
Eberhard & Sedivy, ), a form of preferential looking (Fagan, ;
Fantz, ; Spelke, ). Children listened to stories like () while looking
at an illustration of the story.
() Donald is bringing some mail to Mickey, while a big rainstorm is begin-
ning. He’s carrying an umbrella, and it looks like they’re both going
to need it.
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The dependent measure was whether participants looked more at Donald
(the ﬁrst-mentioned character) or at Mickey in the period after the onset
of the pronoun (he’s) and before the disambiguating word (umbrella; in the
illustration, Donald carries an umbrella and Mickey does not). Critically,
subsequent looks to Donald cannot be attributed to a ﬁrst-mention bias
because they may be due to the disambiguating information.
While all the looking-time studies employed a similar method, restricting
analyses to a brief ambiguous time window, the studies in which children
showed sensitivity to ﬁrst-mention all employed signiﬁcantly longer ambigu-
ous regions, giving children more time (Table ). Moreover, in all of these
studies, the ﬁrst evidence of sensitivity to ﬁrst-mention information emerged
only well after  ms post pronoun onset.
Is it possible that children had insuﬃcient time to show their sensitivity
to ﬁrst-mention in Arnold et al.’s( ) Experiment ? Arnold et al.,
considered and rejected this hypothesis for two reasons. First, in an earlier
study using the same design (Arnold et al., ), adults had successfully
demonstrated sensitivity to ﬁrst-mention within the time allotted. This
could not be explained by generally slower processing on the part of the
children because they were just as fast in a separate condition in which the
pronoun was disambiguated by gender. Second, in Arnold and colleagues'
additional experiment (Experiment ), the pronoun was globally ambiguous
(Puppy [male] is having lunch with Panda Bear [male]. He wants some milk.).
Although children had ample time to respond, at no point were they more
likely to look at the ﬁrst-mentioned character. When asked at the end of the
TABLE . Visual-world studies of the ﬁrst-mention bias in children and adults
Study Age
Length of
ambig. region

st window w/
sig. 
st-men. bias
Song & Fisher,  ; ms –ms
Song & Fisher,  (Exp. ) ; ms –ms
Song & Fisher,  (Exp. ) ; ms –ms
Song & Fisher,  (Exp. ) ; ms –ms
Pyykkönen et al.,  ; >ms –ms
Arnold et al.,  (Exp. ) ;–; N/A
 none
Arnold et al.,  (Exp. ) ;–; ms none
Arnold et al.,  adult ms –ms
Järvikivi et al.,  adult >ms –ms

Song & Fisher,  adult ms –ms

NOTES:
 Only the ﬁrst ms after pronoun onset were analyzed.
 Järvikivi et al. () crossed grammatical role and order of mention in Finnish. The eﬀect
of subjecthood, independent of order of mention, appeared at –ms. The eﬀect of order
of mention, independent of subjecthood, appeared –ms after pronoun onset.
 Note that the eﬀect trended towards signiﬁcance (p=·) in the –ms time window.
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trial to explicitly resolve the pronoun (e.g. answering the question “Who
wants milk?”), they chose at chance rates.
There are good reasons to revisit both these lines of argumentation.
First, in all ﬁve experiments in which children did show sensitivity to
ﬁrst-mention, the eﬀect emerged well after  ms post pronoun onset
(Table ). Had children in those studies been restricted to  ms, those
studies would have concluded –like Arnold et al. ()– that children are
insensitive to ﬁrst-mention. In fact,  ms may be a tight time limit for
adults: in both of the other experiments involving adults, the ﬁrst signiﬁcant
time window extended beyond  ms (Table ). Moreover, it may well be
that although ﬁve-year-olds are as fast as adults at disambiguating pronouns
based on gender, they are nonetheless slower at using ﬁrst-mention.
Diﬀerential eﬀects of development on processing speed across diﬀerent
linguistic stimuli have been observed elsewhere. For instance, while the
speed of processing nouns increases during the second year of life and
then remains stable during the third, the speed of processing adjectives
continues to develop (Fernald, Pinto, Swingley, Weinberg & McRoberts,
; Fernald, Perfors & Marchman, ; Fernald, Thorpe &
Marchman, ).
Second, as noted above, conﬁdence in the results of Arnold et al.’s( )
Experiment  –the experiment involving globally ambiguous pronouns –is
weakened by the fact that in another condition, both adults and children
preferred to resolve the pronoun to a character of the wrong gender / of
the time. Since we would not want to conclude, at least in the case of adults,
that participants think that she refers to a male % of the time, it is not clear
that we should interpret their results in the ambiguous-pronoun condition
as directly reﬂecting sensitivity (or lack thereof) of a ﬁrst-mention bias.
THE EXPERIMENT
In order to contrast the STATISTICAL ERROR,U - SHAPED DEVELOPMENT
and PROCESSING SPEED hypotheses, we conducted a Visual World Paradigm
study employing globally ambiguous sentences with ﬁve-year-olds and
adults. An example image is shown in Figure . Examples of stories from
each of four conditions are shown in Table .
This design provides an oﬀ-line measure of pronoun resolution
(which character is pointed to), mitigating worries about artiﬁcial time limits
on children’s responses. Note that with the exception of the unambiguous
gender condition, these utterances did not contain disambiguating words,
and thus the time over which a ﬁrst-mention bias could emerge is unlimited.
If the U-SHAPED DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS is correct–or if previous
studies showing successful use of ﬁrst-mention by children are false positives
–ﬁve-year-olds should fail to show a ﬁrst-mention bias in the FIRST-MENTION
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CONDITION in either their eye-movements or their points. If the PROCESSING
SPEED HYPOTHESIS is correct, the ﬁrst-mention bias will appear in both
measures, but looks to the ﬁrst-mentioned character should not rise above
chance until well after the time when they do in adults –and after the
 ms ambiguous window present in the second Arnold et al. ()
experiment.
As in the Arnold studies, the GENDER CONDITION serves as a baseline,
revealing how quickly and accurately participants can disambiguate
pronouns based on gender alone. The character with matching gender was
equally likely to be the ﬁrst-mentioned or last-mentioned character.
We included two additional conditions that may help us better understand
what changes in pronoun processing over development. One possible expla-
nation for children’s slow and/or poor performance on ﬁrst-mention tasks
is that they have diﬃculty re-accessing their representation of the
ﬁrst-mentioned character after a delay. To test this hypothesis, we included
the REPEATED-MENTION (SHORT) and REPEATED-MENTION (LONG) conditions,
Fig. . An example image from the experiment, which participants viewed while hearing
passages like “Emily went to school with Hannah. She read ten books.” Emily is on the
left and Hannah is on the right. Children were taught characters’ names prior to the
experiment.
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in which one character is made particularly salient by being mentioned ﬁrst
and mentioned repeatedly. The length of time between the pronoun and the
most recent mention of the target character was manipulated by inserting
two additional ﬁller sentences, where neither character is mentioned, into
the LONG condition (Table ). Alternately, children may have no diﬃculty
re-accessing the most recently mentioned character in the absence of a
competing referent, in which case performance in these conditions should
be strong and fast.
METHOD
Participants
Forty ﬁve-year-olds (;–;; M=;) and thirty-six adults participated.
Nine additional adults and three additional children were excluded for ex-
cessive track loss (track loss in remaining participants: %–%, M=%).
More aggressive thresholds resulted in qualitatively similar results. All
participants were native English speakers. Parents did not disclose any
developmental deﬁcits or disabilities and no evidence of such disabilities
was observed during testing.
Materials
Four novel cartoon characters (two male, two female) were created. Visual
scenes like Figure  were created, with two of the characters standing
equidistant on opposite sides of a midline. Characters were not engaged in
any activities, and the background was simple and did not disambiguate
the referent of the pronoun (a fence, a tree, a rock, a house, etc.).
Each participant received eight GENDER CONDITION trials and four trials in
each of the other conditions. In all conditions, which of the four characters
TABLE . Example stimuli from the present experiment. The critical pronoun
is underlined
Condition Example story
First-mention Emily ate dinner with Hannah. She skipped her salad and only
ate dessert. Can you point to her?
Repeated-mention
(short)
Emily and Hannah are going to Disneyland. Emily has never been
to Disneyland. She is really excited about going to Disneyland.
Can you point to her?
Repeated-mention
(long)
Emily and Hannah are going to Disneyland. Emily has never been
to Disneyland. Disneyland has lots of fun activities. It also has
great food. She is really excited about going to Disneyland.
Can you point to her?
Gender (unambiguous) Emily played baseball with Michael. S/he hit ﬁve homeruns.
Can you point to her?
HARTSHORNE ET AL.
was ﬁrst-mentioned was counterbalanced within and between participants.
Each of the eight REPEATED-MENTION CONDITION stories came in a SHORT
and LONG variant; which variant was used was counterbalanced across
subjects. Similarly, in the GENDER CONDITION we counterbalanced which
character (ﬁrst-mentioned or second-mentioned) matched the pronoun.
Due to a recording error, half of the participants were given the wrong point-
ing instruction (“Can you point to her”) for one of the eight unambiguous
sentences (the gender of the pronoun was incorrect). As the error occurred
over four seconds after the onset of the critical pronoun, it did not aﬀect
the eye-tracking analyses; however, the pointing response for that item was
excluded from the oﬀ-line response analyses for those participants.
The counterbalancing discussed above produced four lists. Stimuli were
placed in a pseudo-random order such that no condition appeared more
than twice in a row. The same order for the stories was used on all four
lists, though with the variants of each story counterbalanced as described
above. Four additional lists were created by reversing the order of the
stimuli, for a total of eight lists. Four to six children and three to six adults
were tested on each list.
Sentences were recorded by a female native English speaker using
child-directed prosody but with no diﬀerential stress on any of the noun
phrases, including the pronouns. The average time elapsed between onset
of the pronoun and onset of the most recently mentioned character
was ms in the ﬁrst-mention condition (min:  ms),  ms in
the repeated-mention (short) condition (min:  ms),  ms in the
repeated-mention (long) condition (min:  ms), and  ms in
the unambiguous gender condition (min:  ms).
Procedure
Participants were familiarized with the characters and drilled on their names
until they could name each character rapidly and without hesitation. They
were then told they would look at pictures and listen to accompanying
stories. In each story, they would be asked to point to someone. If they
were not sure who that person was, they should make their best guess.
Stimuli were presented on a Tobii T desktop eye-tracker, which also
recorded eye-movements. The picture appeared on the screen one second
before the sound ﬁle started playing. Oﬀ-line responses (pointing) were
recorded by the experimenter. The entire procedure, including calibration
of the eye-tracker, took approximately  minutes.
RESULTS
Both oﬀ-line (pointing) and on-line results were analyzed using
binomial mixed-eﬀects models in R (Bates & Sarkar, ;
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R-development-core-team, ), with subjects and sentence templates
as random eﬀects. In no case did including random slopes for initial
ﬁxation improve model ﬁt, nor was the pattern of signiﬁcance diﬀerent
for models with or without random slopes. Thus, only the simpler
random-intercepts-only models are reported.
Oﬀ-line (pointing) results
Participants’ oﬀ-line responses are shown in Figure . The weakest
performance was by children in the ﬁrst-mention condition, so that was
used as the reference cell for the mixed-eﬀects regression. The intercept
was positive and signiﬁcant (z=·, p<·), indicating that, even in this
condition, participants were more likely to point to the target character
than would be predicted by chance. Performance was signiﬁcantly higher
in the repeated-mention short (z=·, p<·), repeated-mention long
gender
repeated-mention
repeated-mention
first-mention
(long)
(short)
Percentage Choosing Target
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
100%
95%
97%
90%
99%
80%
84%
65%
5yos adults
Fig. .O ﬀ-line (pointing) results with standard errors. Note that while the diﬀerence
between adults and children appears to be greatest in the ﬁrst-mention condition, this is an
artifact of binomial distributions: diﬀerences near % are less meaningful than diﬀerences
near %o r% (for review, see Jaeger, ).
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(z=·, p=·), and unambiguous conditions (z=·, p<·). Across
conditions, adults were more likely to point to the target character than
were children (z=·, p<·). There were no signiﬁcant interactions
between subject group and condition (zs<).
On-line (eye-tracking) results
Throughout, direction of eye gaze was analyzed by a midline split: par-
ticipants looking to the left of midline were considered to be ﬁxating
the character on the left. Note that the characters were equidistant from
the midline.
First-mention condition. The oﬀ-line (pointing) results indicate that
ﬁve-year-olds are indeed sensitive to ﬁrst-mention information. According
to the processing speed hypothesis, children failed to show such sensitivity
in Arnold et al.’s( ) Experiment  because they did not have enough
time to demonstrate that sensitivity (possibly because they are systematically
slower than adults). To test this hypothesis, we turned to the eye-tracking
results.
Fixations were binned into successive  ms windows relative to pronoun
onset. If a saccade occurred during a window, the participant was credited as
looking at whichever character they were looking at for the majority of that
window. Results are shown in Figure  (left panel). Children were not more
likely to look at the target character until – ms post pronoun onset.
This is well after the  ms cut-oﬀ in Arnold et al. () but well within
the time allowed in other studies. Adults were slightly faster, showing
a signiﬁcant ﬁrst-mention eﬀect by –ms post pronoun onset.
Note, however, that at pronoun onset, both children and adults were
signiﬁcantly more likely to be looking at the second-mentioned (non-target)
character than the ﬁrst-mentioned (target) character (Looks to
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Fig. . Results for ﬁrst-mention condition in terms of percent looks to target (left panel)
and switch preference (percent switched from distractor to target minus percent switched
from target to distractor; right panel).
AMBIGUOUS PRONOUN PROCESSING
ﬁrst-mentioned: Adults=%, p=·; ﬁve-year-olds=%, p=·), likely
because the second-mentioned character had been mentioned –
ms earlier (median=ms).
In principle, this baseline eﬀect could either result in artiﬁcially slow
responses (looks to target must overcome the baseline eﬀect) or artiﬁcially
fast responses (because people tend to look away from whatever they have
been looking at, these novelty-driven looks away are indistinguishable
from pronoun-driven looks to the target). If these baseline eﬀects lead to
artiﬁcially fast responses, that would only support the processing speed
hypotheses that much more. Thus, we considered the possibility that they
led to artiﬁcially slow results.
To correct for the baseline eﬀect, we analyzed shifts oﬀ the character
being ﬁxated at pronoun onset (Fernald et al., ). We divided the
trial in terms of whether the participant was initially ﬁxating the target or
distractor during the ﬁrst  ms following pronoun onset. During each
subsequent  ms bin, we coded whether the participant was still ﬁxating
the originally ﬁxated character or was now ﬁxating the other character. If
a saccade took place during a  ms bin, the bin was coded according to
where the participant was looking during the majority of the bin. The critical
question was whether the proportion of shifts from distractor to target
exceeded the proportion of shifts from target to distractor, and, if so,
when this occurred. In other words, when are there more switches in the
‘correct’ direction than in the ‘wrong’ direction? To answer this question,
we coded each trial according to whether the participant was looking at the
target or distractor at the onset of the critical word. In each subsequent
time bin, we calculated the percentage of those participants who were initi-
ally ﬁxating the distractor but were now ﬁxating the target–that is, those
who switched in the ‘correct’ direction– and subtracted the percentage of
those participants who were initially ﬁxating the target but were now ﬁxating
the distractor–that is, those who switched in the ‘wrong’ direction. Thus,
a positive number indicates that more have switched in the correct direction,
whereas a negative number indicates that more have switched in the
wrong direction. Interestingly, this analysis led to identical results as
the original analyses, with the ﬁrst signiﬁcant window for adults being at
– ms and for children at – ms (Figure , right panel;
Table ).
Thus, under either analysis, children’s sensitivity to the ﬁrst-mention
bias –demonstrated in the oﬀ-line (pointing) results–emerged too slowly
in the eye-tracking results to have appeared in Arnold et al.’s( )
Experiment , and more slowly than adults. To better understand diﬀerences
in speed of processing, we turn to the other three conditions.
Repeated mention. Results for both repeated-mention conditions are shown
in Figure . At pronoun onset, participants were already ﬁxating the target
HARTSHORNE ET AL.
TABLE . Adult results: signiﬁcance tests (Wald’s z), comparing the proportion of adults initially ﬁxating distractor who are
now ﬁxating target against the proportion of adults initially ﬁxating target who are now ﬁxating distractor, analyzed
separately for each condition and for each  ms window (e.g. ‘ ms’=’– ms after pronoun onset’). Signiﬁcant
time windows are in bold.

ms

ms

ms

ms

ms

ms

ms

ms

ms

ms

ms

ms

ms

ms

ms
Gender
z · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
p · · · · · · · <· <· <· <· <· <· <· <·
First-mention
z · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
p · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Repeated-mention (short)
z · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
p · · · · · · · · · <· <· <· <· <· <·
Repeated-mention (long)
z · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
p · · · · · · · · · · · <· <· <· <·
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character at above-chance rates, an eﬀect with was signiﬁcant in the
REPEATED-MENTION SHORT condition (adults=%, p=·; ﬁve-year-olds=
%, p=·) though not in the REPEATED-MENTION LONG condition (adults
=%, p=·; ﬁve-year-olds=%, p=·). This baseline eﬀect makes it
diﬃcult to use percent-looking-to-target analyses to determine how quickly
participants were able to resolve the pronoun. The switch analyses described
in the previous section revealed that adults had begun to resolve the pronoun
by – ms in the repeated-mention short condition. In the same time
window, the ﬁve-year-olds’ data is trending in the same direction (p=·),
though the result is not fully signiﬁcant until – ms post pronoun
onset. Both adults and children require – ms to resolve the pronoun
in the repeated-mention long condition, though adults begin trending in the
correct direction by – ms post pronoun onset.
Unambiguous. The GENDER trials were counterbalanced such that the target
character was equally likely to be ﬁrst-mentioned or second-mentioned;
as such, there was no baseline bias (adults=%, ﬁve-year-olds=%).
Results are depicted in Figure .B y– ms post pronoun onset, adults
showed a trend (z=·, p=·) towards ﬁxating the target character,
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Fig. . Results for repeated mention short (top panels) and repeated mention long (bottom
panels) in terms of percent looks to target (left panels) and switch preference (percent
switched from distractor to target minus percent switched from target to distractor; right
panels).
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an eﬀect which reached full signiﬁcance by – ms (z=·, p=·).
Split analyses (as described above) showed identical results (see Table ).
For children, the eﬀect reached signiﬁcance somewhat earlier than adults
(– ms; z=·, p=·), an eﬀect which appeared even earlier in the
split analyses (see Table ).
Note that the very early eﬀect of gender in children (– ms) is some-
what surprising. We further investigated these results. In half the trials, the
pronoun referred to the ﬁrst-mentioned character; in the other half,
the second-mentioned character. Closer inspection reveals that children
were much slower to resolve the pronoun in the former case than in the
latter (Figure , Table ). In contrast, adults were equally fast in both
cases (Figure , Table ). We discuss these results below (see ‘Most-recent
mention bias’).
DISCUSSION
We ﬁnd that, like adults, ﬁve-year-olds preferred to resolve ambiguous
pronouns to the ﬁrst-mention character in the previous sentence. This is
not due to learning during the task: ﬁve-year-olds were in fact more likely
to point to the ﬁrst-mentioned character in the ﬁrst-mention condition
during the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h et a s k( M=%) than in the task overall (M=%).
Analysis of eye-movements provides a likely explanation for the fact that
Arnold and colleagues’ () Experiment  showed no eﬀect of
ﬁrst-mention: the ambiguous window ( ms) was too short. In no other
study –including the present one –have children shown sensitivity to
ﬁrst-mention in less than ms. Thus neither statistical error nor
U-shaped development are needed to explain the discrepancy between this
study and those of Song and Fisher or Pyykkönen and colleagues, since
there is no discrepancy.
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Fig. . Results for unambiguous condition in terms of percent looks to target (left panel)
and switch preference (percent switched from distractor to target minus percent switched
from target to distractor; right panel).
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TABLE . Five-year-old results: signiﬁcance tests (Wald’s z), comparing proportion of ﬁve-year-olds initially ﬁxating
distractor who are now ﬁxating target against the proportion of ﬁve-year-olds initially ﬁxating target who are now ﬁxating
distractor, analyzed separately for each condition and for each  ms window (e.g. ‘ms’=’– ms after pronoun
onset’). Signiﬁcant time windows are in bold.

ms

ms

ms

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Gender
z · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
p · · · · <· <· <· <· <· <· <· <· <· <· <·
First-mention
z · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
p · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Repeated-mention (short)
z · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
p · · · · · <· <· <· <· <· <· <· <· <· <·
Repeated-mention (long)
z · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
p · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
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The one remaining complication is Arnold and colleagues’ global
ambiguity study (, Experiment ), in which there was no time limit on
response and yet children nonetheless showed no evidence of a ﬁrst-mention
bias. However, as discussed in the ‘Introduction’, both the children and
adults in that study also had diﬃculty using gender to assign pronoun
reference. Since we can be reasonably conﬁdent that adults are quite adept
at resolving male pronouns to males and female pronouns to females–and
in fact even children were at ceiling in our own experiment–this suggests
that a straightforward interpretation of the Arnold global ambiguity study
is not warranted. Further research will be required to understand exactly
what factors inﬂuenced their results, but the simplest explanation is that
participants were confused, leading to errors on some portion of the trials.
If this same confusion aﬀected the ﬁrst-mention trials, that may have
depressed evidence of ﬁrst-mention –which in general is not as robust as
the gender eﬀect, even in adults –to below detectable levels in the child data.
In sum, there seems little reason to doubt that by ﬁve years of age –and,
most likely, by two and a half –children are sensitive to ﬁrst-mention.
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Fig. . Results for the unambiguous condition, with trials on which the pronoun was
resolved to the ﬁrst- and second-mentioned character analyzed separately. Results for adults
are shown in the top panels and results for children in the bottom panels, graphed in terms
of percent looks to target (left panels) and switch preference (percent switched from
distractor to target minus percent switched from target to distractor; right panels).
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TABLE . Comparing ﬁve-year-old results for gender trials when the target was the ﬁrst-mentioned character or the
second-mentioned character. Signiﬁcant time windows are in bold.
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Target=ﬁrst-mention
z · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
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Several questions remain, however. Inspection of the results across studies
that employed participants of diﬀerent ages suggests that speed of
application of ﬁrst-mention information increases through development
(Figure ). While the results for the very youngest children may bear
replication, this trend is potentially an intriguing ﬁnding, since –as noted
by Arnold and colleagues ()– children are not necessarily slower than
adults at some other aspects of pronoun processing (see Figures – and
surrounding discussion, above). In the remainder of this section, we consider
possible explanations for this ﬁnding, should it prove robust.
Account for the developmental speed-of-processing trend
Adults are faster than children at using ﬁrst-mention information. We
consider two –not necessarily mutually exclusive–possible explanations
below.
Most-recent mention bias. Children’s slow use of ﬁrst-mention information
may be explained by a diﬃculty in suppressing recent information in favor of
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Fig. . Plot of results from present and previous ﬁrst-mention eye-tracking experiments.
Mean age of participants is plotted against the earliest evidence of use of ﬁrst-mention
information (the mean time for the ﬁrst signiﬁcant window). Adults in Song and Fisher
() showed an eﬀect which was strictly signiﬁcant in the –ms window but
signiﬁcant by items and not subjects in the –ms window; the diﬀerence was split,
and time-of-resolution is shown at ms. Arnold et al. () is excluded because
no evidence of use of ﬁrst-mention information was found.
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earlier information. The ﬁrst piece of evidence comes from the fact that
children resolved pronouns in the GENDER CONDITION much more quickly
when the target referent was the most-recently mentioned character than
when it was the ﬁrst-mentioned character, a diﬀerence which was not
observed in adults. This result is particularly striking because of the large
baseline diﬀerences: when the target was the second-mentioned character,
ﬁve-year-olds were already looking at the target at pronoun onset on ·%
of the trials, whereas when the target was the ﬁrst-mentioned character,
they were looking at the target on only ·% of trials. Thus, although
shift of attention to the target would be harder to detect when the target
was the second-mentioned character, evidence of such shifts was seen
ﬁrst in that condition. This data suggest that the most recent character
may be more activated for children than adults, causing the ﬁrst-mention
bias for ambiguous pronouns to emerge more slowly as it ﬁghts against
the tide.
Interestingly, recent work has suggested a similar explanation for
children’s well-known diﬃculty with syntactic raising. A number of studies
(e.g. Choe, ; Hirsch & Wexler, ) have found that children have
diﬃculty comprehending (a) but not (b):
() a. John seems to Mary to be happy.
b. It seems to Mary that John is happy.
Choe () has suggested that the issue is not syntactic raising per se,
but rather due to Mary intervening between the predicate be happy and
its intended argument, John. When the word order for (a) is rearranged
so that Mary no longer sits between the predicate and its argument (),
children’sd i ﬃculty interpreting the sentence disappears:
() To Mary, John seems to be happy.
Thus, it may be that in general children ﬁnd it easier to attribute new
information to the most-recently mentioned entity.
Converging results come from the comparison of the REPEATED-MENTION
(SHORT) and REPEATED-MENTION (LONG) conditions. Children resolved
the pronoun at least half a second earlier in the SHORT condition than in
the LONG condition, and the diﬀerence between conditions was signiﬁcant
for every time window from  to  ms. In contrast, this eﬀect for adults
was much reduced: Although the ﬁrst strictly signiﬁcant window was earlier
for the SHORT condition (– ms), the LONG condition began trending
towards signiﬁcance at the same time, and at no point was the comparison
of conditions signiﬁcant for adults.
Thus, while analysis of the GENDER condition suggests that children ﬁnd
a very recently mentioned character particularly attractive as a referent
for a pronoun, analysis of the REPEATED MENTION conditions suggest that
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children have particular diﬃculty in resolving a pronoun to a character that
has not been mentioned recently, even if no other plausible referent has been
mentioned in the interim. These two facts in combination should make the
FIRST-MENTION condition particularly diﬃcult for children, as they must
suppress a recently activated character and re-activate an earlier-mentioned
character.
Discourse pragmatics. Recent evidence suggests that recruiting ﬁrst-
mention information to resolve pronouns is diﬀerent in kind from exploiting
gender information. Kehler and colleagues (Kehler, ; Kehler et al.,
) have argued that the ﬁrst-mention bias is one side eﬀect of our
ability to use the structure of the discourse to predict which entity in one
sentence will be mentioned again in the next one, and have provided data
showing that this bias exists whether or not that re-mention involves
a pronoun.
On this account, sentences in a discourse are governed by a discrete set
of discourse relations, each of which speciﬁes how the information in a
given sentence relates to that in previous sentences. The sentences in our
FIRST-MENTION condition were governed by the ELABORATION relation, in
which the second sentence elaborates on the situation described in the ﬁrst
(Michael had lunch with Jacob. He ate a chicken sandwich). A key feature of
this relation is that that the topics of the sentences (typically the subjects)
usually co-refer, which results in a ﬁrst-mention bias if the topic/subject
of the second sentence is a pronoun. As Kehler and colleagues note,
studies reporting a ﬁrst-mention bias typically employ sentences governed
by the ELABORATION relation or the OCCASION relation, in which the
second sentence describes an event that occurred after the ﬁrst (John went
to the store. He bought ice cream) and which also strongly prefers co-referring
topics.
Other discourse relations work diﬀerently (in addition to above, see, inter
alia, Crinean & Garnham, ; Garvey & Caramazza, ; Hartshorne &
Snedeker, ; Stewart, Pickering & Sanford, ; Stevenson, Crawley
& Kleinman, ). For instance, when the RESULT relation holds, the
ﬁrst sentence describes an event and the second sentence describes a result
of that event, typically in terms of the consequences to the aﬀected entity.
Since the entity aﬀected by an event typically appears as the direct object
of the verb (Levin & Rappaport Hovav, ), this often results in
a second-mention bias:
() Sally frightened Mary so she ...
Importantly, deriving the appropriate pronoun resolution bias depends on
inferring the correct discourse relation. Thus, what may be developing is
the ability to identify the appropriate discourse relation. The fact that
AMBIGUOUS PRONOUN PROCESSING
researchers have not yet uncovered the mechanisms behind this in adults
suggests that it may be a complex process requiring time and practice.
CONCLUSION
Previous studies suggested divergent conclusions about whether children
can use ﬁrst-mention information to resolve pronouns. The present results
reconcile these ﬁndings. Children at least as young as ; (Song & Fisher,
) can use ﬁrst-mention information. Interestingly, their speed of
doing appears to increase during the preschool years (Figure ). This in-
crease is remarkable and bears further investigation. We do not know
when children reach adult levels of proﬁciency, as the school years remain
unstudied. Above, we suggest that this speed-up may be a result of children
learning to suppress an incorrect but more recent salient alternative and reac-
tivate earlier information; identifying how children acquire this ability and
what changes are necessary to the underlying processes may be a proﬁtable
direction for future work. Similarly, these results highlight gaps in our
understanding of discourse relations and re-mention biases (cf. Kehler,
; Kehler et al., ): much remains to be learned about when and
how children acquire knowledge of discourse structure.
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